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Abstract
We study the spillovers from government intervention in the mortgage market on households’ 
consumption using the household survey data from the US. After an expansionary mortgage 
market operation, the increase in consumption of homeowners with mortgage debt is large 
and signifi cant, while the consumption response of homeowners without the mortgage debt 
is small and insignifi cant. Non-homeowners also increase their consumption but less than 
mortgagors. We also fi nd that expansionary policy signifi cantly increases the consumption 
inequality of mortgagors. We explain these facts through the lens of a lifecycle model with 
incomplete markets and endogenous housing choice. Reduction in credit rates creates 
extra wealth for the mortgagors while a reduction in interest rates shifts this wealth towards 
consumption. An increase in wealth is bigger for those with a larger mortgage- this exacerbates 
consumption inequality.
Keywords: mortgage debt, life-cycle models, government-sponsored enterprises, credit policy.
JEL classifi cation: E21, E44, R38, G28.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia cómo las políticas públicas de intervención en el mercado 
hipotecario afectan al consumo de los hogares utilizando los datos de la encuesta de 
hogares de los EE.UU. La política pública analizada consiste en compras públicas en el 
mercado secundario de hipotecas ya concedidas. Se demuestra empíricamente que, 
después de las compras públicas, aumenta el gasto de los hogares con hipotecas, 
y en menor medida de quienes alquilan su vivienda, pero no el de los hogares 
propietarios no endeudados. Las compras públicas aumentan también la desigualdad 
en el gasto de los hogares con hipoteca. Estos resultados se explican por un modelo 
de ciclo vital y mercados incompletos en el que los hogares deciden cuánto gastar 
en vivienda. La reducción del coste de crédito genera riqueza adicional para los endeudados, 
y la caída de los tipos de interés canaliza este aumento de riqueza hacia el gasto. Al ser 
mayores los efectos entre los hogares con hipoteca más elevada, las compras públicas de 
hipotecas aumentan la desigualdad en el gasto.
Palabras clave: deuda hipotecaria, modelo de ciclo vital, empresas patrocinadas por el 
gobierno, política de crédito.
Códigos JEL: E21, E44, R38, G28.
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1. Introduction
Activity in secondary mortgage markets boosts mortgage lending, lowers mortgage
rates and influences prices on other financial markets (Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn,
2018). In this paper, we study how this activity affects the largest component of GDP,
household consumption. We show that households’ financial position is crucial in un-
derstanding the spillovers from the activity in secondary mortgage markets to private
consumption. We proxy households’ financial position through housing tenure status.
First, we show empirically, that following an expansionary policy change to the secondary
mortgage markets, homeowners with mortgage debt increase their spending substan-
tially, while homeowners without the mortgage debt do not react to policy change. Non-
homeowners also increase their consumption but less than mortgagors. We also show
that the same expansionary policy significantly increases the consumption inequality of
mortgagors. Second, to explain this empirical evidence, we present a life-cycle model
with incomplete markets and endogenous housing choice in the vein of Kaplan, Mitman
and Violante (2018); Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017); Sommer and
Sullivan (2018); Wong (2019). In our policy experiment, we reproduce the macroeconomic
effects of credit policy changes of Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) and simultane-
ously cut both interest and mortgage rates as well as the spread between the two. Lower
mortgage rates imply lower mortgage payments for the mortgagors and hence a rise in
long-term permanent income for this group. Lower interest rates imply that part of this
extra income goes to consumption rather than saving. In the model, wealth is a function
of house size and thus the mortgage size. Lower mortgage payments generate a higher
increase in wealth that in turn increases inequality among the mortgagors.
In our empirical exercise, we explore the link between expansionary credit policy
changes and an increase in households’ expenditure. In particular, we focus on credit
policy changes through exogenous governmental intervention in the mortgage markets
via various federal housing agencies, and mortgage assets purchases of these agencies.
For the most part, credit policy changes are a reaction to business cycle conditions (the
most recent QE3 being the prime example). To analyze the response of consumption to
any of these policy changes, it is, therefore, important to isolate the policy changes that
are orthogonal to the business cycle (such as long-term objectives of increasing the home-
ownership). We combine the exogenous non-cyclically motivated events from Fieldhouse
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and Mertens (2017) with mortgage purchases of the two largest federal housing agencies
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). We then use the former as an instrument in regressions
of households’ consumption on measures of agency purchase activity. We measure con-
sumption using household-level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the
Survey of Consumer Finances. If credit market interventions were neutral (Meltzer, 1974;
Greenspan, 2005; Lehnert, Passmore and Sherlund, 2008; Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn,
2018) an increase in agency purchases should have little impact on private consumption.
What we find empirically, is that credit policy changes lead to an increase in private con-
sumption of mortgagors and an increase in consumption inequality for this group.
In our theoretical exercise, we use a structural model to identify the transmission
mechanism we found in our reduced-form analysis. We model the credit policy change
experiment by replicating the aggregate macroeconomic effect of mortgage market inter-
ventions documented in Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018). In particular, we focus on
change in both interest and mortgage rates as well as on change in the spread between
the two. Our first finding is that lower mortgage rates imply lower mortgage payments
for the mortgagors and a rise in long-term permanent income for this group. In terms of
mechanisms in the model, we identify the access to refinancing as a crucial transmission
mechanism for expansionary credit policy. These results are in line with both the recent
microeconomic evidence (Wong (2019) emphasizes the role of refinancing for transmis-
sion of monetary policy to consumption) as well as macroeconomic evidence (following
a credit policy shock Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) show an increase of mortgage
originations due to refinancing). Since the opportunity cost of saving goes downwhen the
interest rates drop as well - mortgagors consume this extra income instead of saving. The
results we find are also in line with Cloyne, Ferreira and Surico (2018), who argue that the
behavior of mortgagors resembles that of wealthy hand-to-mouth households and empir-
ically document a similar response of individual consumption to expansionary monetary
policy shock. Indeed, in the model, mortgagors hold little liquid wealth, outstanding
mortgage debt and illiquid assets in the form of the house. We then analyze the response
of other types of households: renters and outright homeowners. Similarly to mortgagors,
renters’ utility from consumption outweighs that of saving, and they consume more once
the new credit policy is at hand. For outright homeowners, who are mostly older than
renters and mortgagors, any changes in the interest rate will have a very small effect,
given that the marginal propensity to consume for these households is already quite low.
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On top of that, with the presence of the bequest motive, it will outweigh that of dissav-
ing one, and the homeowners will increase consumption and save instead. Using the
same policy experiment, we also reproduce the increase in consumption inequality. In the
model, net wealth depends on assets and on mortgage outstanding (that is zero for both
renters and outright homeowners). The increase in wealth is larger for households with
a bigger mortgage (and therefore bigger house), generating a heterogeneous response of
consumption increase within the mortgagors’ group.
Related Literature. In exploring the link between exogenous credit policy changes and
individual consumption our paper adds to both empirical and theoretical literature on
housing and mortgage markets. From the empirical side, we relate to four strands of liter-
ature. Firstly, we analyze the US federal government interventions into the mortgage mar-
kets. For the most part the literature focused on governments’ intervention in terms of tax
policies. Recent studies include Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009); Hilber and
Turner (2014); Floetotto, Kirker and Stroebel (2016); Sommer and Sullivan (2018), among
others. Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) is the most recent study that instead ana-
lyzes the interventions to the federal housing agencies, rather than any tax policies. In
this paper, we use exogenously identified policy interventions from Fieldhouse, Mertens
and Ravn (2018); unlike Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018), however, we analyze the
transmission mechanisms through which the policy operates using the US household sur-
vey data.
Secondly, this paper is related to literature that analyzes the interaction between fed-
eral housing agencies and other markets. The most recent studies include Gonzalez-
Rivera (2001); Naranjo and Toevs (2002); Lehnert, Passmore and Sherlund (2008); Han-
cock and Passmore (2011, 2014) as well as Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018). We focus
specifically on the effect of mortgage purchases of governmental housing agencies on con-
sumption of different types of households using a novel identification strategy.
Thirdly, our paper is related to the literature on the role of household balance sheet
channels in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policy shocks. These include Ia-
coviello (2005); Eggertsson and Krugman (2012); Luetticke (2015); Greenwald (2016); Hed-
lund et al. (2016); Cloyne, Ferreira and Surico (2018); Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2017);
Auclert (2017); Bilbiie (2017), to name a few. Coibion et al. (2017) also uses US household
level data to study the effect of conventional monetary policy on income and consump-
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tion inequality. Like in Cloyne, Ferreira and Surico (2018), we use the households’ housing
tenure status to proxy their asset and debt position.
Finally, this paper is related to literature that analyzes the effects of monetary policy
shocks on inequality. Coibion et al. (2017) uses US household level data to study the
effect of conventional monetary policy on income and consumption inequality. We fol-
low Coibion et al. (2017) methodology to construct the measure of expenditure inequality
between all types of households as well as within each housing tenure group. Unlike
Coibion et al. (2017) we focus on the effect of credit policy shocks on expenditure inequal-
ity.
From the theoretical side, ourmodel resembles the recent literature that extendsHuggett
(1996) model to incorporate housing decision and aggregate housing and mortgage mar-
kets. To name a few, we build on the models of Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2018);
Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017); Sommer and Sullivan (2018); Wong
(2019), that analyze heterogeneous agents life-cycle economies with uninsurable income
risk in which householdsmake a housing andmortgage choice. Unlike these papers, how-
ever, we do not focus on the aggregate implications of different macroeconomic shocks but
rather analyze the individual households’ behavior.
Structure of the Paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out
the empirical model and presents the impulse response analysis. Section 3 develops a
life-cycle economy with endogenous housing choice and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
Section 4 calibrates the model and describe the properties of the baseline economy. Sec-
tion 5 analyzes the effect of mortgage market intervention within the model framework
and discusses transmission mechanisms. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical Framework
2.1. Institutional Background and Identification of Exogenous Policy
Changes
The total mortgage debt in the US accounts for about 80% of total household debt. For
instance, by the 3rd quarter of 2017, the total mortgage debt was about $8.7 trillion, while
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To account for the endogeneity in agency market activity we use a narrative identi-
fication approach and use major regulatory policy events as an instrument for agency
purchase activity. Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) document significant policy changes
that are expected to affect agency portfolios and isolate those events (which they call non-
cyclical events) that are free of confounding influences in the spirit of Romer and Romer
1For example, in the 2001 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances that we use in this paper, the average
household held more than 60% of his net worth in housing. Source: Author’s calculations.
auto, credit card and student debt combined were about $2.3 trillion. Furthermore, this
debt goes towards financing the largest asset in the households’ net worth - housing.1
The US mortgage market is also unique. The US federal government is heavily in-
volved in the mortgage market (especially in terms of residential mortgage purchases)
though various agencies: Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and Government
Agencies (see Fieldhouse andMertens (2017); Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) for de-
tailed history and overview of how these agencies operate). Given the data availability, in
this paper, we focus on the involvement of the government through the two largest GSEs:
Fannie Mae, founded in 1938 and publicly traded since 1968, and Freddie Mac, founded
in 1970. These agencies were established by Congress to support secondary mortgage
markets by buying and securitizing loans from primary mortgage lenders; they are not,
however, allowed any direct lending. The share of mortgage debt held by these agencies
grew substantially since their establishment and reached a peak of almost 20% by 2004,
slowly declining ever since. Figure 1 plots the agency mortgage holdings as a share of
total mortgage debt in the US over time. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the
data.
In the empirical section of this paper, we focus on the portfolio purchases of the hous-
ing agencies, shown in the solid blue line in Figure 2, and how it affects expenditure
of households with different debt position. Unfortunately, simply correlating measures
of agency activity with households’ expenditure ignores potential endogeneity problems
(see Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018)). On one hand, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
respond to market conditions and thus act pro-cyclically. On the other hand, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac’s role is to provide stability on the mortgage markets and thus act
counter-cyclically. Ignoring these potential problems makes the causal inference invalid.
(2004) and Ramey (2011). These policy changes are indicated by vertical red lines in Fig-
ure 2. We quantify these changes by taking a calculated impact of these policies changes
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Figure 1: Agency mortgage holdings as a percent of total mortgage originations. Data
is between 1980 and 2016. Grey areas represent NBER recessions. Source: Authors own
calculations.
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Figure 2: FNMA & FHLMC net purchase for portfolio investment. Data is between 1980
and 2016. Grey areas represent NBER recessions. Source: Author’s own calculations
(agency net purchases) and Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) (policy changes).
from Fieldhouse and Mertens (2017) and dividing by the average annualized level of orig-
inations in the preceding year. As most of the policy interventions after 2006 were related
to the 2007/2008 financial crisis and were mostly cyclically motivated, we limit the analy-
sis to the pre-crisis sample.
2.2. Impulse Response Specification
To evaluate the effect of agency purchase activity on households’ consumption we
conduct an impulse response analysis of shock to agency mortgage purchase. We use a
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2Using monthly data, Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) find that narrative measure is a strong pre-
dictor for the horizons between 4 to 48 months, that is in line with our estimates.
local projections instrumental variable approach in the spirit of Jorda` (2005) where we use
the narrative instrument for identification.
Following Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018), we start by assessing whether the
narrative policy changes do lead to significant changes in net agency purchases. Our first-
stage regression specification is of the form
∑hj=0 pt+j
Xt
= a˜h + c˜h
m˜t
Xt
+ d˜h(L)Zt−1 + u˜t+h, (1)
where pt is the agency’s net purchase, Xt trend in real mortgage originations, m˜t is non-
cyclically motivated narrative measure in real dollars, and Zt is a set of controls (defined
below). d˜h(L) denotes the polynomial of order 4. We pick the value of horizon h for
which out instrument is the strongest. For that, we run regression (1) for horizons h = 1
(one quarter) to h = 20 (five years) and pick h that maximizes the robust F-statistics on the
excluded instrument for each h. The F-test statistics exceeds 10 for horizons between 1 and
3 quarters, indicating that the narrative measure is a strong predictor of agency purchases
for this horizon. The F-statistics declines for longer horizons.2 Given these results we
restrict the analysis to horizons between 1 and 3 quarters. Specifically, we focus on the
agency purchase activity 2 quarters after the shock, as the robust F-statistic is the highest
and equal to 15. Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the robust F-statistics on the excluded
instrument in each of the first-stage regressions (1) for horizons h = 1 (one quarter) to
h = 20 (five years).
We now proceed to identifying the effect of agency purchase activity on variable of
interest. Our goal is to identify the response to shocks to expectations of future agency
purchasing activity. For a given outcome variable yt, we estimate the response at horizon
h using
yt+h − yt−1
yt−1
= ah + bh
(
4
2
× ∑
2
j=0 pt+j
Xt
)
+ dh(L)Zt−1 + ut+h, (2)
where
4
2
× ∑
2
j=0 pt+j
Xt
(3)
denotes net agency purchases made over a 2 quarter period, divided by annualized origi-
nations Xt; where the choice of 2 quarters horizon is based on the first-step regression.
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The regression in (2) estimates the quarter h ≥ 0 response to a time 0 news shock
to agency purchases. Expected agency purchases are proxied by agency net purchases
made over the next half a year. As in Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018), to address
endogeneity, we use the indicator of non-cyclical policy events, deflated by the core PCE
price index and scaled by trend originations Xt , as the instrument.
To make the results comparable to Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018), we use the
same set of control variables Zt (converted to quarterly values). These are the lagged
growth rates of the core PCE price index, a nominal house price index, and total mortgage
debt, the log level of real mortgage originations, housing starts, and lags of several interest
rate variables: the 3-month T-bill rate, the 10-year Treasury rate, the conventional mort-
gage interest rate, and the BAA-AAA corporate bond spread. They also include lags of
agency net purchases and commitments as a ratio of Xt as well as the unemployment rate
and the growth rate of real personal income. See Appendix A for a detailed description of
the data sources and definitions.
2.3. Measuring Expenditure Data
Weuse households’ expenditure on non-durable goods and services as a response vari-
able yt in equation (2). To construct our measure of expenditure we use the interview
section of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) between 1980 and 2007.3 We define
non-durable goods and services as food, alcohol, tobacco, fuel, light and power, clothing and
footwear, personal goods and services, fares, leisure services, household services, non-
durable household goods, motoring expenditure, and leisure goods. We adjust the food
at home between 1982 and 1987 following Aguiar and Bils (2015). We also define house-
holds’ income as an amount of income before tax in the past 12 months. After 2005, BLS
started imputing missing income observations. Before 2004 we impute missing income
observations as in Coibion et al. (2017). We exclude households that are in either top 1%
or bottom 1% of either the non-durable expenditure or income level. We also exclude
households that report zero food expenditure. Finally, we exclude households whose
household head is below 25 and over 74 years old. We also keep the households that do
not change the housing tenure status between the interviews.
3Data between 1980 and 1995 is obtained from ICPSR throughUKData Service. Post-1995 data is publicly
available at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) website.
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2.4. The Effect of Agency Purchases on Expenditure: Pseudo-Cohort
Analysis
In this section, we document the response of households’ expenditure to shock to
agency purchases. The timing is such that the shock can be treated as a news shock to
net purchases made over the next half a year.
As documented by Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018), an increase in mortgage pur-
chases by the agencies boosts mortgage lending and lowersmortgage rates. It is, therefore,
important to distinguish between those households who own the house with a mortgage
and those without. In the long run, agency purchases also influence house prices and ex-
pand homeownership, therefore the effect on those households who own the house and
those who do not might be different. The CEX survey, on top of containing rich income
and expenditure data, contains information on housing tenure status. We utilize this in-
formation and group the households into three categories based on their tenure status in
the spirit of Cloyne, Ferreira and Surico (2018). The categories are renters, mortgagors and
outright owners. Unfortunately, given the rotating panel nature of the CEX survey, it is not
possible to follow individual households for more than four quarters over which they are
observed. We, therefore, employ a grouping estimator to aggregate individual observa-
tions into pseudo-cohorts by housing tenure as in Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985). One
concern with this identification strategy is the endogenous switching between housing
tenure status because of policy changes. In the CEX, we can track exactly the households
that switch between the interviews. We find that a very small number of households actu-
ally do switch the status between the interviews. We run two estimations - one including
the households who switch, and one excluding, and our results remain identical in both
cases. Thus, for our main exercise, we exclude the switchers.
We then look at the response of households’ expenditure, based on their housing
tenure status, to a 1% increase in net purchases by the agencies, anticipated 2 quarters in
advance, under the specification in (2) using the non-cyclically motivated narrative mea-
sure as an instrument. Figure 3 plots the coefficients bh from equation (2) over the horizon
h = 1 (one quarter) to h = 8 (two years) along with 90% and 95% confidence intervals.
We see from the figure, that after a news shock to agency net purchases the only group
that significantly increases their expenditure are the mortgagors, for the horizon between
three and seven quarters, while the change in expenditure for renters and owners is in-
significant for all horizons. Moreover, a year after the shock we document a clear ranking
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Figure 3: Impulse response of expenditure to an additional to a 1% increase in net pur-
chase by FNMA & FHLMC, anticipated 2 quarters before. Blue areas and broken lines
represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively.
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of the responses: mortgagors react the most (about 0.03 basis points), followed by renters
(about 0.015 basis points), and finally homeowners (close to zero).
2.5. Response of Expenditure Inequality
In Section 2 we documented the evidence that following a news shock to agency pur-
chase activities there is a heterogeneous response between housing tenure groups. We
now look at what happens with expenditure within each of the groups. For that, we con-
struct a Gini coefficient of the level of expenditure on non-durable goods and services in
the spirit of Coibion et al. (2017). Our measure of inequality is raw: we do not control for
any household characteristics (number of household members, age, education). The only
control characteristic that we take is the housing tenure status.
Figure 4 plots the response of the Gini coefficient (measured between 0 and 100) to a
1% increase in net purchases by agencies, anticipated 2 quarters before. The top left panel
plots the response of the Gini coefficient to a news shock for all the households in the data.
We can see the positive and significant increase (at 90% significance level) in expenditure
inequality one quarter after the shock by about a quarter of percentage point. Expendi-
ture inequality within the renters’ group (top right panel) does not respond significantly.
We can neither see a significant increase in expenditure inequality within the homeown-
ers’ group (bottom right panel). With regards to expenditure inequality within the mort-
gagor group (bottom left panel), there is a positive and significant (both at 90% and 95%
significance level) increase of inequality by almost half percentage point. This suggests
that an overall increase in expenditure inequality is mostly driven by an increase within
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the mortgagors. In the next section, we will analyze what characteristics of households
(depending on their income level and their housing tenure status) and of mortgagors in
particular (depending on the length of their mortgage) drives the heterogeneous response
of expenditure and expenditure inequality between the three groups of households.
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Figure 4: Impulse response of expenditure Gini to a 1% increase in net purchase by FNMA
& FHLMC, anticipated 2 quarters before. Blue areas and broken lines represent 90% and
95% confidence intervals, respectively.
3. A Life-Cycle Model with Housing Markets
In the previous section, we documented the causal effect of news shock to agencymort-
gage purchases. Unfortunately, with the data available it is not possible to exactly identify
the transmission mechanism through which the effects work. To understand which chan-
nel is exactly responsible for an increase in expenditure for mortgagors only, and increase
in the inequality for that group, in this section we develop a Huggett (1996) type of het-
erogeneous agent life-cycle model with uninsurable risk, endogenous housing choice, and
aggregate mortgage market shocks (see Sommer and Sullivan (2018); Kaplan, Mitman and
Violante (2018); Wong (2019)). Through the lens of this model, we explain the empirical
evidence we found in the previous sections and analyze which channels contribute to the
results indicated.
3.1. Demographics, Preferences and Labor Income
Demographics Time is discrete. Economy is populated by a continuum of finitely-lived
households. Age is indexed by j = 1, . . . , J. Households work for first Jr − 1 periods and
are retired until period J. Life span is certain and all households die with certainty at age
J.
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Preferences Households maximize expected lifetime utility is given by
E0
[
J
∑
j=1
βj−1u(cj, sj) + βJv(aJ)
]
, (4)
Here cj denotes the consumption of goods at age j and sj denotes the consumption of
housing services at age j, β is the discount factor and aJ is the amount of bequest left my
a household of age J. The only source of uncertainty in the economy is the idiosyncratic
income shock (described below). Utility function u is a CES aggregator over consumption
and housing
u(c, s) =
[
(1− φ)c1−γ + φs1−γ] 1−ϑ1−γ − 1
1− ϑ (5)
while the bequest function v is given as in De Nardi (2004)
v(a) = ψ
(a+ a)1−ϑ − 1
1− ϑ , (6)
where φ denotes housing preference, 1/γ is the elasticity of substitution between non-
durable consumption and housing services, 1/ϑ is the IES, ψ measures the strength of
bequest motive while a measures how luxurious is the bequest.
Labor Income Working-age households receive exogenous income yj given by
yj = χjexp(j), (7)
χj is the deterministic age profile and j is the idiosyncratic component that follows first-
order Markov process. After retirement, households receive social security benefits
yj = ρssyJr , j > Jr,
where ρss is a replacement rate and yJr are their earnings in the last working period.
4 The
pay as you go social security system is run by the government. Finally, let Yj denote the
age-dependent transition of earning from age j to age j+ 1 conditional on income yj.
4To reduce the numerical burden, we only keep track of last-period’s income to determine household’s
pension. Alternatively, at a cost of increasing the state space in the model we can include the whole history
of income.
3.2. Housing
Households can either rent or own the house. Houses are characterized by their size,
which is given by a discrete set. Let H˜ denote the set of houses available for rent, while H
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denotes the set of owner-occupied houses. We assume that the price of the house is fixed
and is equal to ph while the rental price of a housing unit is denoted by ρh, which is equal
to a fixed fraction of house price.
To distinguish house owners from house renters, we assume that housing generates
service flow equal to the size of the house, i.e. s = h˜, where h˜ ∈ H˜, while owning a house
generates an extra utility for the household, such that s = ωh, where ω > 1 and h ∈ H.
Every period the homeowner has to pay the maintenance cost δhphh that fully offsets
physical depreciation of the house, and tax cost τhphh. There is a transaction cost equal to
κhphh associated with buying or selling the house. There is no transaction cost for renting.
3.3. Assets, Mortgages and Market Arrangements
Liquid Assets Households can save in one-period bonds, a, with a exogenous interest
rate given by ra. Households are not allowed any unsecured borrowing and their borrow-
ing constraint is given by
a ≥ 0 (8)
Let qa denote the price of bond, such that qa = 1/(ra + 1)
Mortgages House purchase can be financed by a mortgage. A household that takes
out a new mortgage with a principal balance m′ receives from a lender qmm′ units of the
numeraire good. The mortgage price qm is fixed and is such that qm < 1. We assume
that all mortgages are long-term, subject to interest rate rm and have to be repaid over the
remaining working life of the borrower. We assume that mortgage rate rm is given by
rm = (1+ ι)ra, (9)
where ι controls the spread between ra and rm. Down-payment for a borrower who takes
out a mortgage of size m′ to buy a house of size h′ is
phh′ − qmm′ (10)
Mortgage origination is also subject to a fixed origination cost κm. When taking out a
mortgage, households have to satisfy two constraints. The first one is the maximum loan-
to-value constraint: the initial mortgage size must be less than a fraction λm of the value
of the house being purchased
m′ ≤ λmphh′ (11)
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The second constraint is the maximum payment-to-income constraint: the first minimum
mortgage payment must be less than a fraction λπ of the income at time of purchase
πminj (m
′) ≤ λπyj, (12)
where we define the minimum payment function πminj (m
′) using a constant amortization
formula
πminj (m
′) = rm(1+ rm)
Jr−j
(1+ rm)Jr−j − 1m
′ (13)
that assumes that the borrower is required to make Jr − j payments π that exceed min-
imum payment requirement after mortgage origination. Retired households are not al-
lowed to take out a mortgage, but they can buy a house out of savings. The remaining
mortgage principle evolves according to
m′ = m(1+ rm)− π (14)
We also assume that households are allowed to refinance the existing mortgage. When
refinancing (taking out a new mortgage), households have to repay the existing mort-
gage balance, pay the fixed mortgage origination cost, and satisfy both loan-to-value and
payment-to-income constraints. Households are also allowed to sell the house, given that
they repay the remained of the mortgage as well as transaction costs. Finally, households
can default on the mortgage, if they cannot satisfy the minimum payment requirement.
Households that choose to default incur the utility cost of ξ and are forced to rent the
smallest available dwelling that period.
3.4. Government
In the model, government receives revenues from the property tax τh and progressive
income tax T (y,m) that depends on income y and mortgage holdings m. Interest payed
onmortgages is deductable up to a predetermined threshold. We assume that tax function
is progressive as in Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) and T takes the form
T (y,m) = y− τ0y (y− rm min{m, m¯})1−τ
1
y (15)
where τ0y and τ1y measure the progressivity of the tax system and m¯ denotes the maximum
allowed deductible mortgage. On the spending side, the government finances social se-
curity system for the households. The government runs a balanced budget, with services
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G (not valued by the household) adjusting to absorb any difference between government
income and spending.
3.5. Dynamic Problem of the Household
We now describe the dynamic problem of households. There are two types of house-
holds in the economy: homeowners and non-homeowners. Let Vnj denote the value func-
tion of non-homeowner at age j and let Vhj denote the value function of the homeowner
at age j. When non-homeowner enters the economy at age j he has two choices - either
remain non-homeowner in the next period (rent a house) or become a homeowner next
period (buy a house). Let Vrj and V
o
j denote the value function of renters and buyers,
respectively. Non-homeowners essentially solve the following problem
Vnj (x
n
j ) = max
{
Vrj (x
n
j ),V
o
j (x
n
j )
}
(16)
where xhj denotes the vector of state variables of the non-homeowner, described below.
When home-owner enters the economy he has four different choices. He can either con-
tinue paying the existing mortgage (let Vpj denote the value function of the mortgage
payer), repay the existing mortgage and get a new mortgage (let V fj denote the value
function of the mortgage refinancer), repay the remaining mortgage and sell the house
(let Vsj denote the value function of the seller) or default on the mortgage payments (let
Vdj denote the value function of mortgage payer who defaults). Every period, the home-
owner solves the following problem
Vhj (xh) = max
{
Vpj (x
h
j ),V
f
j (x
h
j ),V
s
j (x
h
j ),V
d
j (x
h
j )
}
(17)
where xhj denotes the vector of state variables of the homeowner, described below.
Non-homeowners of age j enter the period with holding of liquid assets aj and ex-
ogenous income yj. Homeowners of age j, on the other hand, also enter the period with
outstanding balance on the mortgage m and house h. When m > 0 we refer to homeown-
ers as the mortgagor, whereas when m = we refer to them as outright owners. Thus
xnj =
(
aj, yj
)
(18)
xhj =
(
aj,mj, hj, yj
)
(19)
We now describe in detail the problem of each household in a recursive form. From here
on the state and control variables with no subscript denote the current age/period vari-
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ables, i.e. aj = a, while state and control variables with ′ superscript denote the next
period/age variables, i.e. aj+1 = a′.
Renters The households of age j that enter the period as non-homeowners and decide
to rent next period, choose the level of consumption today (c), the level of liquid savings
next period (a′) and the size of the rented dwelling for the next period (h˜′). In recursive
form, their problem can be written as
Vr(xn) = max
c,a′,h˜′
u(c, s) + βE′
[
Vn′
(
xn′
)]
(20)
Renters solve the above problem subject to:
c+ ρhh˜′ + qaa′ ≤ a+ y− T(y, 0) (21)
a′ ≥ 0
s = h˜′, h˜′ ∈ H˜
y′ ∼ Y(y)
where the equations above are budget constraint, borrowing constraint, housing services
production and income evolution, respectively. Let r (xn) denote the decision of non-
homeowner with state variables xn to rent a house.
Buyers The households of age j that enter the period as non-homeowners and decide to
buy a house, choose the level of consumption today (c), the level of liquid savings next
period (a′), the size of the house to buy (h′), and the level of mortgage to take out. In
recursive form, their problem can be written as
Vo(xn) = max
c,a′,h′,m′
u(c, s) + βE′
[
Vh
′ (
xh
′)]
(22)
Renters solve the above problem subject to:
c+ qaa′ + phh′ + κm ≤ a+ y− T(y, 0) + qmm′ (23)
m′ ≤ λmphh′
πmin(m′) ≤ λπy
a′ ≥ 0
s = ωh′, h′ ∈ H
y′ ∼ Y(y)
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where the equations are the budget constraint, LTV constraint, PTI constraint, borrowing
constraint, housing services production, and income evolution, respectively. Let o (xn)
denote the decision of non-homeowner with state variables xn to buy a house, with
r (xn) + o (xn) = 1
Mortgage payers The households of age j that enter the period as homeowners with a
given level of mortgage m and house size h, and decide to make the payment towards the
mortgage balance, choose the level of consumption today (c), the level of liquid savings
next period (a′), and the size of payment (π). In recursive form, their problem can be
written as
Vp(xh) = max
c,a′,π
u(c, s) + βE′
[
Vh
′ (
xh
′)]
(24)
Mortgage payers solve the above problem subject to:
c+ qaa′ + (δh + τh)phh′ + π ≤ a+ y− T(y,m)
m′ = (1+ rm)m− π
π ≥ πmin(m)
a′ ≥ −λaphh
s = ωh′, h′ = h ∈ H
y′ ∼ Y(y) (25)
where the equations are the budget constraint, mortgage balance evolution, minimum
payment requirement, borrowing constraint, housing services production, and income
evolution, respectively. When choosing the current level of mortgage payment, the house-
hold need to satisfy minimum payment requirement. This constraint is similar to the PTI
requirement on origination (equation ), but does not limit household making payments
out of the income only (for example, a household that received a negative income shock
can still make a mortgage payment by using some of the assets). Let p
(
xh
)
denote the
decision of homeowner with state variables xp to make a payment towards the mortgage.
Mortgage refinancers The households of age j that enter the period as homeowners with
a given level of mortgage m and house size h, and decide to refinance the existing mort-
gage, choose the level of consumption today (c), the level of liquid savings next period
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(a′), and the level of new mortgage (m′). In recursive form, their problem can be written
as
V f (xh) = max
c,a′,m′
u(c, s) + βE′
[
Vh
′ (
xh
′)]
(26)
Mortgage refinancers solve the above problem subject to:
c+ qaa′ + (δh + τh)phh′ + (1+ rm)m+ κm ≤ a+ y− T(y,m) + qmm′
m′ ≤ λmphh′
πmin(m′) ≤ λπy
a′ ≥ −λaphh
s = ωh′, h′ = h ∈ H
y′ ∼ Y(y) (27)
where the equations are the budget constraint, mortgage balance evolution, PTI con-
straint, borrowing constraint, housing services production, and income evolution, respec-
tively. Let f
(
xh
)
denote the decision of homeowner with state variables xp to refinance
the existing mortgage.
Sellers The households of age j that enter the period as homeowners with a given level
ofmortgagem and house size h, and decide to sell their house in the current period, choose
the level of consumption today (c), the level of liquid savings next period (a′) and the size
of the rented dwelling for the next period (h˜′), as they will remain non-homeowners for
the following period.
Vs(xn) = max
c,a′,h˜′
u(c, s) + βE′
[
Vn′
(
xn′
)]
(28)
House sellers solve the above problem subject to:
c+ ρhh˜′ + qaa′ ≤ as + y− T(y,m) (29)
a′ ≥ 0
s = h˜′, h˜′ ∈ H˜
y′ ∼ Y(y)
where as denotes the current level of assets plus the proceedings from selling the house
net of transaction costs and mortgage balance, given by
as = a+ (1− δh − τh − κh)phh− (1+ rm)m. (30)
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Let s
(
xh
)
denote the decision of homeowner with state variables xp to sell the house.
Defaulters The households of age j that enter the period as homeowners with a given
level of mortgage m and house size h, might decide to default on their mortgage if they
aren’t able to make the minimum payment towards the mortgage balance. If they default,
they choose the level of consumption today (c) and the level of liquid savings next period
(a′); to prevent the strategic default in the model, the households that default are forced to
rent the minimum dwelling available for renting and are not allowed to buy a house for
another period. Computationally, this gives us more flexibility of controling the level of
defaults in the model. In recursive form, their problem can be written as
Vd(xn) = max
c,a′,h˜′
u(c, s)− ζ + βE′
[
Vn′
(
xn′
)]
(31)
where ζ denotes the utility penalty. Defaulters solve the above problem subject to:
c+ ρhh˜min + qaa′ ≤ a+ y− T(y, 0) (32)
a′ ≥ 0
s = h˜min, h˜min ∈ argmin H˜
y′ ∼ Y(y)
Let d
(
xh
)
denote the decision of homeowner with state variables xp to default on the
mortgage, with
p
(
xh
)
+ f
(
xh
)
+ s
(
xh
)
+ d
(
xh
)
= 1
3.6. Definition of Equilibrium
Our definition of equilibrium consists of households’ consumption decision rules{
cr(xn), co(xn), cp(xh), c f (xh), cs(xh), cd(xh)
}
(33)
savings decision rules {
ar(xn), ao(xn), ap(xh), a f (xh), as(xh), ad(xh)
}
(34)
mortgage decision rules {
mo(xn),mf (xh),π(xh)
}
(35)
and housing choice rules {
h˜r(xn), ho(xn), hp(xh), h f (xh), h˜s(xh)
}
(36)
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and government expenditure G, such that
1. Households’ policy function solve problems (20), (22), (24), (26), (28) and (31) given
prices ph and ρh
2. Government expenditure G clears governmental budget constraint
3. Supply of owner-occupied housing is fixed at some level Ĥ. The price of housing ph
is such that in equilibrium, the demand for owner-occupied housing (which consists
of new houses bought, existing housing of mortgage payer minus housing of sellers
and defaulters) is equal to the supply. Similarly, ρh is determined by the equilibrium
conditions in the rental market.
We next describe the value of the model parameters that we use to calculate the equi-
librium.
4. Parametrization
The model calibrated at annual frequency. We set the parameters of the model to in-
come and wealth moments from the 2001 wave of SCF. A subset of parameters are set
exogenously without the need to solve for the steady-state of model. The target model-
implied and data moments are reported in Table 1.
Targeted Moments
Moment Model Value Empirical Value
Net worth to income ratio 5.8 5.5
Ratio of net worth 75/50 1.6 1.5
Homeownership rate 0.63 0.66
Default rate 0.002 0.005
House size of owners to renters 1.5 1.5
Table 1: Targeted moments in the parametrization
Demographics and Preferences The model period is one year. Households enter the
economy in age 21, retire at age 65 and live until age 81. This corresponds to Jr = 44 and
J = 60. We use Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007) to set the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and housing services is set to 1.25 (corresponding to γ = 0.8). We
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use the same strategy as Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2018) set risk aversion parameter
ϑ equal to 2 so that the EIS is 0.5 The properties of the baseline model are robust to change
in ϑ as long as EIS is less than 1. The discount factor β is set equal to 0.964, implying
the average net worth to income ratio of 5.8, slightly above empirical value of 5.5 from
SCF. To control to which extent bequest is perceived as luxury good, we set a = 7.7. The
strength of the bequest motive is controlled by ψ, which we set equal to match the ratio of
net worth at age 75 to net worth at age 50 (to proxy the importance of bequests as a saving
motive). For ψ equal to 7, the model-implied ratio is 1.6, compared to 1.5 in the SCF.
The extra utility from owned housing, ω, is set to be equal to 1.015, to match the average
homeownership rate. The model-implied homeownership rate is 63 percent compared to
66 percent in the data. The dis-utility from defaulting, ζ, is set equal to 5. The model-
implied default rate is about 0.2 percent, compared 0.5 percent in the data. Finally, we set
the share of utility from housing φ equal to 0.16, that matches the share of housing in total
consumption expenditure in NIPA. These are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameter values (demographics and preferences)
Demographics and Preferences
J Length of life 60
Jr Working life 44
γ 1/EIS 0.8
ϑ Risk aversion 2
β Discout factor 0.964
a Bequest as luxury 7.7
ψ Strength of bequest 7
ω Utility from homeownership 1.015
ζ Disutility from default 5
φ Share of housing in utility 0.16
Labor Income and Government Expenditure The deterministic and stochastic compo-
nent of labor earnings, χj, is calculated using the data on labor earnings from 2001 wave
of the SCF. We set the social security replacement rate to 60 percent. The parameters of
the tax function (15), τ0y and τ1y , are set to 0.75 and 0.151, respectively and is taken from
Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2017) for the US. Parameter τ0y measures the average
level of taxation and parameter τ1y measures the degree of progressivity. The maximum
level of tax-deductible mortgage, m¯, is set to correspond to $1 million. The property tax
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τh is set to 1 percent, which is the median tax rate across the US. These are summarized in
Table 3.
Labor Income and Government Expenditure
χj Deterministic life-cycle profile —
τ0y Income tax parameter 0.75
τ1y Income tax parameter 0.151
ρss Replacement rate 0.6
m¯ Mortgage deduction limit 20*
τh Property tax 0.01
* A unit of the final good corresponds to $50000, which is the median income in the 2001 wave in SCF.
Table 3: Parameter values (labor income and government expenditure)
Housing We fix the grid for the owner-occupied houses (H) and rented houses (H˜),
so that households are only allowed to choose to buy or rent of the dwellings from the
grid. The minimum size of the owner-occupied dwelling is set to 1.5 to represent the
ratio of the average house size of owners to renters (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2015). The
depreciation rate of housing is set equal to 1.5 percent. Transaction cost of selling the
house, κh, is set to 8 percent, which is the average value reported in Quigley (2002). These
are summarized in Table 4.
Liquid Assets and Mortgages We set the interest rate ra exogenously equal to 3 percent,
and the spread parameter ι equal to 33 percent. This implies the mortgage rate rm of
about 4 percent. The spread is set to match the observed difference between the average
rate on 30-year fixed-term mortgages (series MORTGAGE30US from FRED) and the 10-
year T-Bill rate (series GS10) in 2001. The implied price of bond, qa is equal to 0.97. The
mortgage origination cost, κm, is set to equivalent of $ 2000, corresponding to the sum
of application, attorney, appraisal and inspection fees (see Kaplan, Mitman and Violante
(2018)). The minimum down payment requirement qm is set to 15 percent and controls
the overall market tightness. This number is consistent with recent estimates by Sommer
and Sullivan (2018) and Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2018). These are summarized in
Table 4.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1940
Housing, Liquid Assets and Mortgages
δh Depreciation rate 0.015
κh Transaction cost 0.08
ra Interest rate 0.03
ι Spread 0.33
rm Mortgage rate 0.04
qa Price of bond 0.97
κm Mortgage origination cost 0.04*
λa Maximum borrowing limit 0
qm Down payment requirement 0.15
* A unit of the final good corresponds to $50000, which is the median income in the 2001 wave in SCF.
Table 4: Parameter values (liquid assets and mortgages)
4.1. Properties of the Baseline Model
In this subsection we describe the life-cycle properties of the baseline model with
parametrization specified in Tables 2-4. Figure 5 displays the lifetime profiles for sev-
eral key model variables. Panel A plots the mean labor and pension income (solid black
line) and non-durable consumption (dashed black line). Households increase their con-
sumption until about age 30 and then keep it constant until the end of the lifetime. Panel
B displays the mean lifetime savings profile of the households. As the households have
the bequest motive - they do not dis-save towards the end of the lifetime and leave the
portion of the savings as a bequest for the future generations. Panel C displays the mean
mortgage balance in the economy. Households take out the mortgage later in life when
they are about 30 years old so that the payment-to-income constraint (3.5) is satisfied. As
the income is stochastic, some households do not take out the mortgage until later in life.
Finally, Panel D displays the average homeownership rate in the economy (solid black
line) to that of the data (broken red line). Some households (that receive good income
shock early in life) buy a house early, while the others postpone the purchase until later in
life. Households that had a sequence of bad income shocks towards the end of the lifetime
sell their house and choose to rent instead, and use the selling proceedings to smooth con-
sumption and leave the remainder towards bequest. The model matches well the general
shape of homeownership over the life-cycle to that of the data (red broken line in Panel
D).
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Figure 5: Mean life-cycle profiles in the baseline model. Panel A displays mean income
(black solid line) and consumption (black dashed line). Panel B displays mean holdings
of liquid asset. Panel C displays mean mortgage balance. Panel D displays mean home-
ownership rate in the model (black solid line) and in the data (red dotted line).
5. Mortgage Market Intervention Experiment
We next perform a mortgage market intervention experiment in the baseline model us-
ing the empirical evidence on the effects of governmental mortgage markets interventions
on interest and mortgage rates.
5.1. Macroeconomic Effects of Mortgage Market Intervention
In their paper, Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) document the macroeconomic
effects of news shock to agency mortgage purchases. They find that following a shock,
the interest rates, as well as the mortgage rates, decrease, as does the spread between
mortgage rates over the interest rates. Panels A and B in figure 6 plots the response of
mortgage and interest rates, respectively. Panel C in figure 6 plots the response of spread
between the two along with one standard deviation confidence intervals. We see that
interest and mortgage rates (panels A and B) decline significantly immediately after the
shock and remain low for at least two years. Spread between the two (panel C) declines
significantly 3 quarters after the shock and remains negative for half a year.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1940
5.2. Transitional Dynamics and Transmission Mechanism
To understand the transmissionmechanism throughwhichmortgagemarket interven-
tion operates, we perform the following policy experiment. Suppose that in period 0 the
economy is in the steady state, where interest rates and mortgage rates are fixed, and so is
the spread between the two. Between period 0 and period 1 (a year in the model), there is
an exogenous intervention to the mortgage markets such that interest rate ra goes down.
To account for the fact that empirical evidence suggests the drop in mortgage rates, as
well as the drop in spreads, and using
rm = (1+ ι)ra
we also assume that spread parameter ι also declines. In period 1, households enter the
period with new interest and mortgage rates, and adjust their choice of consumption,
mortgage balance, and liquid savings using the new policy functions. Figure 7 displays
the simplified timeline of the policy experiment.
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Figure 6: Impulse response of mortgage rate (Panel A), interest rate (Panel B), and spread
(Panel C) to an additional to a 1% increase in net purchase by FNMA & FHLMC, antici-
pated 2 quarters before.
Period 0:
economy in the SS
Market Intervention:
ra ↓, ι ↓
Period 1:
new policy functions
Figure 7: Timeline of the policy experiment
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Following an exogenous change in the interest rate and spread parameter, the group
that responds the most to policy change is the mortgagor group. After a cut in the interest
and mortgage rates, they increase consumption by 1.3 percentage points. Renters also
respond positively to change in the interest rates, increasing their consumption by 0.7
percentage points relative to initial steady state. Outright homeowners, on the other hand,
react the least to the policy change and increase their consumption by only 0.2 percentage
points.
Our second empirical result reported in Section 2.5 states that expenditure inequality
We then analyze whether the policy experiment can reconcile the empirical evidence
presented in section 2.4. Empirically, we found that exogenous intervention to mortgage
markets makes households with the mortgage significantly increase their consumption
expenditure, followed by a positive (but insignificant) increase in consumption expendi-
ture of renters. The policy intervention has the smallest (and insignificant) increase in
consumption expenditure for outright homeowners. We identify the same three groups
of people in the model: renters (either renters that choose to rent, or homeowners that sell
their house or default on the mortgage), mortgagors (either mortgagors who make pay-
ments towards positive mortgage balance or refinancers) and outright owners (household
that own the house and have zero mortgage outstanding). We then calculate the change
in consumption expenditures for these types of households. We report the results of the
policy experiment in Table 5.
Tenure Change in Consumption
Renters 0.7pp
Mortgagors 1.3pp
Outright Owners 0.2pp
Table 5: Response of consumption expenditure to mortgage market intervention
increases significantly for mortgagors while there is no significant increase for the other
two groups of households. To compare the empirical results with those of the model, we
calculate the model-implied Gini coefficient before and after the policy experiment took
place for all three groups of households. We then look at the change of the Gini coefficient
after the policy. We report the results of the policy experiment in Table 6.
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Following an exogenous change in the interest rate and spread parameter, the expen-
diture Gini increases significantly for mortgagors. After a cut in the interest and mort-
gage rates, the consumption inequality measure increases by 1.7 percentage points. For
renters and outright homeowners, the change in expenditure inequality is small, 0.2 and
-0.1 percentage points, respectively. This response goes in line with the empirical evidence
reported in Section 2.5.
We next analyze what is the transmission mechanism that policy operates through and
what drives the increase in consumption reported in Table 5. The decrease in the interest
rate has a straightforward effect on consumption of all households - as the interest rates
drop, the opportunity cost of savings goes down and households choose to consume the
extra income instead. For the outright homeowners (who are also older), both the low
marginal propensity to consume as well as the bequest motive play the opposite role to
that of the interest rates and as the result, they do not adjust their consumption. Both
renters and mortgagors act like typical hand-to-mouth consumers: lowering the interest
rate makes them save less and consume more. So why do mortgagors and renters re-
act differently? The mortgage market intervention also affects the mortgage rate and the
spread between the mortgage and interest rates. Mortgagors minimum payment require-
ment, given by equation (13), depends on the mortgage rate rm. Lowering the rate rm (due
to lowering in ra and ι) relaxes the payment constraint for the mortgagors. So on top of the
effect coming directly from lower interest rates, they also receive extra income from lower
Table 6: Response of expenditure Gini to mortgage market intervention
Tenure Change in Gini
Renters 0.2pp
Mortgagors 1.7pp
Outright Owners -0.1pp
minimum payment. In the model, mortgagors utilize this by having access to refinanc-
ing: the benefit of refinancing coming from lower payments outweighs the fixed cost of
refinancing, increasing the current level of wealth for the mortgagor group. Renters still
observe an increase in consumption, but it’s not as strong as that of the mortgagor group.
Interestingly, we find that those renters that closer to buying mortgage increase consump-
tion more relative to the households who take out the mortgage later one, implying there
is some sort of anticipation effects present in the model.
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6. Conclusions
We study the heterogeneous impact of expansionary credit policies by combining ex-
ogenous policy changes in US federal housing agenciesmortgage holdingswith household-
level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Survey of Consumer Finances.
We group households into pseudo-cohorts based on their housing tenure status: renters,
mortgagors, and homeowners. We show that following an increase in agency purchases,
householdswithmortgage increase their spending, while outright homeowners and renters
do not adjust their expenditure significantly. We explain this evidence through the lens
of a Huggett (1996) type of heterogeneous life-cycle model with endogenous housing
choice and idiosyncratic income risk. We calibrate the mortgage market intervention to
be consistent with empirical macroeconomic evidence and show that the lower interest
rate partially explains the small increase in expenditure of renters. We also show that low
marginal propensity to consume and bequest motive outweighs the effect of a lower inter-
est rate for outright homeowners Finally, and more importantly, we also show that lower
mortgage rates as well as the change in spread between the rates generates mortgage refi-
nancing motive and explains the high observed increase in expenditure for mortgagors.
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A. Agency and Market Data
Below we describe the macroeconomic data used in the empirical section of the paper.
We follow Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn (2018) closely in constructing the variables that
we use.5 Residential mortgage debt is the sum of home mortgages and multifamily residen-
tial mortgages from the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the United States. Nom-
inal GDP is from the National Income and Product Accounts. Agency mortgage holdings
is the sum of the retained mortgage portfolios of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Between
1980 and 2003, the data on retained mortgage portfolio is available from various issues
of Federal Reserve Bulletin. After 2003 the data is from Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s
monthly volume summaries combined with annual OFHEO/FHFA reports.6 Residential
mortgage originations before 1997 is frommonthly releases of the Survey ofMortgage Lend-
ing Activity from the HUD. After 1997 the data on originations is available from Datas-
tream (series USMORTORA) via The University of Manchester . Net portfolio purchases is
the sum of corresponding series for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Individual series before
2003 are available from various issues of Federal Reserve Bulletin. After 2003 the data is
from Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s monthly volume summaries. Conventional mortgage
rate is the 30-year fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgage rate, available at Freddie
Mac mortgage market survey. Housing starts is obtained from FRED database at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series HOUST). House prices is measured by the Freddie
Mac house price index (FMHPI) available on Freddie Mac’s website. Nominal price level is
obtained from FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series PCEPILFE).
Personal income is obtained from FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(series PI).Unemployment rate is obtained from FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis (series UNR). Short- and long-term interest rates are 3-month and 10-year Trea-
5Please note that during the writing of this paper, the data and replication materials from Fieldhouse,
Mertens and Ravn (2018) were not yet publicly available and all the variables described in the appendix
are own calculations. As the data for Ginnie May was not available, it is excluded from the definitions of
agency mortgage holdings and agency purchases. Similarly, net commitments were not publicly available
for all years and were thus excluded. Other variables follow closely those of Fieldhouse, Mertens and Ravn
(2018).
6Freddie Mac’s monthly volume summaries that were not available online or via U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the years 2003-2008 were kindly provided by Freddie Mac’s Equity Relations
Department.
sury rates, obtained from FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series
TB3MS and GS10). BAA and AAA corporate bond rates are the Moody’s seasoned BAA and
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AAA yields, obtained from FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series
BAA and AAA).
B. Testing for Exclusion Restrictions
Below we present the plot of robust F-statistics on the excluded instrument of the first-
stage regressions of cumulative agency net purchases given by equation (1) for different
horizons h. Horizontal dashed line represents the threshold level of 10.
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Figure B.1: First Stage Robust F-statistic. Figure displays robust F-statistics on the ex-
cluded instrument of the first-stage regressions of cumulative agency net purchases.
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